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Abstract
It used to be thought that rational coherence and metaphysical possibility went hand 
in hand. Kripke and Putnam put a spanner in the works by proposing examples of 
propositions which seem to violate this principle. I will propose a nuanced form of 
modal rationalism consistent with the Kripke/Putnam cases. The rough idea is that 
rational coherence entails possibility when you grasp the essential nature of what 
you’re conceiving of.
Keywords Conceivability · Possibility · Modal rationalism · Physicalism · 
Consciousness · Zombies · Hard problem · Two-dimensional semantics
In my recent book Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, I proposed a princi-
ple linking rational coherence and metaphysical possibility, as part of an argument 
against physicalism. Although it was not the focus of concern in this book, I had 
hoped that that principle might undergird a generalised account of our knowledge 
of modality. I have subsequently realised, however, that that principle has limited 
application, in a way that conflicts with these broader ambitions. In this paper I will 
outline these limitations and propose ways of overcoming them. The result, I hope, 
is the bare bones of an account of how our knowledge of metaphysical modality 
is grounded in our capacity to discern whether or not a proposition is rationally 
coherent.
In Sect. 1, I will give a brief overview of the view I defended in Consciousness 
and Fundamental Reality. In Sect. 2 I will explain its limitations and propose a way 
of resolving them.
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1 Introduction
It used to be thought that rational coherence and metaphysical possibility went hand 
in hand, something we can capture with the following principle:
Simple Modal Rationalism—For any proposition P, P is rationally coherent 
(where a proposition is rationally coherent just in case it can’t be ruled out a 
priori) iff there is a metaphysically possible world at which P is true.
Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1973) put a spanner in the works by proposing examples 
of propositions which seem to violate this principle, such as <water is XYZ>.1 We 
cannot know a priori that water is not XYZ, and yet there is no genuine possibility 
corresponding to this state of affairs. In Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, 
I proposed a nuanced form of modal rationalism consistent with the Kripke–Put-
nam counterexamples to Simple Modal Rationalism. The rough idea is that rational 
coherence entails possibility when you grasp the essential nature of what you’re 
conceiving of. We can call this general approach ‘Essentialist Modal Rationalism’.
Water is essentially  H2O and it is thus not possible for it to be XYZ. Why then is 
it coherent to suppose that water is XYZ? The reason is that the concept <water> 
does not reveal the essential nature of water. When conceiving of water as ‘water’ 
we don’t conceive of it in terms of its essential nature (being composed of  H2O 
molecules) and thus it is coherent to suppose that it has some other essential nature 
(being composed of XYZ molecules). According to the modal rationalism I want to 
defend, coherence and possibility go together when the concepts being employed 
yield complete understanding of what is being conceived of (from hereon, by ‘pos-
sibility’ I mean metaphysical possibility).
In Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, I expressed this in terms of the dis-
tinction between transparent and opaque concepts, defined as follows:
• Transparent Concept (1st attempt)—A concept C referring to entity E is trans-
parent just in case C reveals the nature of E (i.e., what it is for E to be part of 
reality is a priori accessible for someone possessing C, in virtue of possessing 
C), for example, <sphericity> and <party>.
• Opaque Concepts—A concept C referring to entity E is opaque just in case C 
reveals little or nothing about the nature of E, for example, <water> and <gold> 
(Goff 2017: 74).
For sphericity to be part of reality (by being instantiated2) is for there to be some-
thing with all points on its surface equidistant from its centre; for someone possess-
ing the concept of sphericity, this can be known a priori. For water to be part of 
1 Kripke (1980), Putnam (1973).
2 The form of reality will depend on the kind of entity. For an individual to be part of reality is for it to 
exist; for a property to be part of reality is for it to be instantiated (Platonists might want to distinguish 
a property’s existing from its having concrete reality); for an event to be part of reality is for it to take 
place.
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reality is for there to be something composed of  H2O molecules; in contrast to the 
case of <sphericity>, this cannot be known a priori in virtue of possessing <water>.
We are now in a position to give a first attempt at defining a special notion of 
coherence:
Transparent Coherence (1st attempt)—For any proposition P, P is transpar-
ently coherent just in case:
 (i) P contains only transparent concepts, and
 (ii) P is rationally coherent, i.e. the truth of P cannot be ruled out a priori.
Building on this, I defended the following principle linking coherence to possibility:
Transparency Coherence Principle (1st attempt)—For any proposition P, if P 
is transparently coherent, then P is possibly true.
And on the basis of this principle, I built a case against physicalism, roughly:
The transparency argument against physicalism
1. Transparency Coherence Principle—For any proposition P, if P is transparently 
coherent, then there is a metaphysically possible world at which P is true.
2. The proposition <there are zombies> is transparently coherent.
3. If there is a metaphysically possible world at which <there are zombies> is true, 
then physicalism is false.
4. Therefore, physicalism is false.
The defence of premise 2 involved arguing that the concepts involved in <there are 
zombies>, namely physical and experiential concepts, are transparent.
2  Essentialist Modal Rationalism
2.1  Accommodating brute one offs
The Transparency Coherence Principle outlined above is a one-way conditional, and 
as such it does not rule out that there are propositions that are possibly true but not 
transparently coherent (in the sense defined above). If there are such propositions, 
and we know that they are possibly true, then we cannot account for our knowl-
edge of their possible truth in terms of our knowledge of their transparent coherence 
(because ex hypothesi they aren’t transparently coherent, at least not in the above 
sense). And hence, if we want a general account of our modal knowledge in terms of 
our knowledge of transparent coherence, then we need the Transparency Coherence 
Principle in a biconditional form:
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Biconditional Transparency Coherence Principle—For any proposition P, P is 
transparently coherent iff P is possibly true.3
Unfortunately, so long as we are understanding rational coherence as defined in 
Sect. 1, there are counterexamples to the above principle. To explain why, we need 
to introduce some more terminology. Let us say that an entity has a ‘defining nature’ 
just in case it is possible to understand what it is for that specific entity to be part 
of reality. Kinds (e.g. water) and properties (e.g. sphericity) seem to have defining 
natures; we can grasp what it is for these things to be instantiated. But it is not clear 
that particular individuals, such as a particular electron E, have defining natures. E 
falls under a kind—the kind electron—and that kind has a defining nature. But there 
is nothing to be grasped about what it is for E, as opposed to some other electron, to 
exist. In this sense, particular individuals are ‘brute one offs.’ (Or at least that is how 
it seems. Perhaps particular individuals do have defining natures but grasping them 
is beyond our ken. Perhaps God knows each thing in terms of its defining nature).
For any entity that lacks a defining nature, the notion of a transparent concept 
of that entity gets no purchase. If there is nothing to grasp about what its reality 
consists in, then there can’t be a concept that reveals what its reality consists in. 
This leads to difficulties for the Biconditional Transparency Coherence Principle. 
Let us assume that a human individual lacks a defining nature.4 Now consider the 
proposition <Lewis Carroll exists but Karl Marx does not>. This proposition is 
both coherent and possibly true. But it is not transparently coherent, as it contains 
opaque concepts. Nor is it possible to replace the non-transparent concepts involved 
with co-referring transparent concepts, given that these concepts denote entities that 
lack defining natures. Thus, we have a genuine possibility—the possibility of Lewis 
Carroll existing without Karl Marx—which does not correspond to a transparently 
coherent proposition.
In Consciousness and Fundamental Reality, I tried to circumnavigate this prob-
lem simply by focusing on those propositions which are rationally coherent in the 
above sense, and defining the link between coherence and possibility in terms of 
those propositions. The problem with this strategy, as stated above, is that it prevents 
us giving a general account of modal knowledge in terms of knowledge of transpar-
ent coherence.
I now think there is a fairly straightforward way of extending the formal defini-
tion of transparent coherence to avoid this difficulty. The informal idea of transpar-
ent coherence is that it’s what a proposition has when it reveals to the thinker the full 
4 In fact, it is somewhat plausible that a human person has a defining nature in terms of the sperm and 
egg from which it was formed. In this case, that sperm and that egg will either be brute one offs or will 
also have defining natures in terms of their origins and their DNA. The entities that define those origins 
will either be brute one offs or have defining natures given in terms of their origins. It seems plausible to 
me that as we trace this back at some point we’ll get back to brute one offs. In any case, we could simply 
change the example to avoid this worry (if there are no examples of brute one offs, then we can’t change 
the example, but in that case the problem goes away).
3 If we specifically want to account for our modal knowledge, then strictly speaking all we need is the 
following principle: For any proposition P, P is transparently coherent iff P is known to be possibly true. 
However, I can’t see that this further qualification will make much difference to the discussion.
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reality of what she is conceiving of (when employing the proposition). Now if you 
don’t know whether or not ‘Lewis Carroll’ and ‘Karl Marx’ co-refer, then that’s a 
sense in which you don’t fully grasp the state of affairs you’re conceiving of when 
you entertain the proposition <Lewis Carroll exists but Karl Marx does not>. For 
all you know, you might be conceiving of one person existing without himself, but 
equally you might be conceiving of one person existing without some other person. 
In so far as this proposition does not reveal to the thinker that Lewis Carroll is dis-
tinct from Karl Marx, it fails fully to reveal to the thinker what state of affairs she’s 
conceiving of.
The obvious way to fill in this knowledge gap is to conjoin the proposition with 
the true information about whether or not Lewis Carroll and Karl Marx are iden-
tical. Doing this would remove the ignorance discussed in the previous paragraph 
whilst leaving us with a coherent proposition:
≪Lewis Carroll exists without Karl Marx> & <Lewis Carroll is not identical 
with Karl Marx≫
Of course, if it had turned out (epistemically) that Lewis Carroll was identical 
with Karl Marx, then adding that information would have produced an incoherent 
proposition:
≪Lewis Carroll exists without Karl Marx> & <Lewis Carroll is identical with 
Karl Marx ≫ 5
Whether or not instances of the above form of proposition are possibly true depends 
on whether or not the entities referred to are identical, and adding this information 
gives us an incoherence in cases where the truth of the original proposition was 
impossible and a coherence in cases where the truth of the original proposition was 
possible. In other words, we’ve brought coherence and possibility back together.
This suggests a way to extend the definition of transparent coherence:
Transparent coherence (refined definition)
• Proposition P is transparently coherent just in case:
• (i) P is coherent,
• (ii) In so far as P contains concepts referring to entities with defining natures, 
those concepts are transparent,
• (iii) In so far as P contains concepts referring to brute one offs  B1,  B2…  Bn: P* is 
coherent, where P* is the proposition formed from conjoining P with true infor-
mation concerning all identities and non-identities between the entities involved 
in  B1,  B2…  Bn.
With this extended definition of rational coherence, the problem is avoided. The 
proposition <Lewis Carroll exists without Karl Marx> is transparently coherent and 
corresponds to a genuine possibility; the proposition <Lewis Carroll exists without 
5 I am assuming here that the necessity of identity is a priori.
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Charles Dodgson> is not transparently coherent and does not correspond to a genu-
ine possibility. Exactly the results we wanted.
One might wonder why the modal constraints on brute one offs are confined to 
facts concerning identity/non-identity. In fact, there may well be further modal con-
straints given by the essential kinds brute one offs falls under. If E is essentially 
a member of the kind electron, then E will be an electron in any possible world 
in which it exists. For E to lack a defining nature is for E’s specific identity—its 
identity over and above the kinds it falls under—to be brute: there is nothing to be 
grasped about what it is for E to exist as opposed to some other electron. It follows 
that the only constraints on E’s identity, beyond being an electron, are those given 
by logic and the necessity of identity. Some may want to analyse brute identity in 
terms of the possession of an individuating property—a haecceity—or a substratum. 
Alternately one may simply accept that there are brute facts about identity and non-
identity lacking any deeper underpinning. I need not decide between these options 
for my purposes here.
2.2  Accommodating Ostrich nominalism
This modified definition of transparent coherence improves on the original by virtue 
of accommodating a new kind of entity: brute one offs. However, it still retains an 
exclusive focus on entities, which leads to a further difficulty for the Essentialist 
Modal Rationalism we are building upon it. Consider the view David Armstrong 
mockingly dubbed ‘Ostrich nominalism’, according to which there are no proper-
ties but there are irreducible facts about how entities are. For the Ostrich nominalist, 
there is no such thing as redness but nonetheless roses are red, and there is no such 
thing as negative charge but nonetheless electrons are negatively charged. We might 
put the view by saying that whilst there are no such things as properties, there are 
such things as propertied objects: red roses, charged electrons, etc.
I have defined transparent concepts as a subset of entity-referring concepts: they 
are those entity-referring concepts that reveal the nature of the entities they refer 
to. But if there are no properties, then there are no entity-referring concepts associ-
ated with predicates, and hence there are no transparent concepts associated with 
predicates (given the above definition of a transparent concept). And, of course, if 
there are no such things as properties, then we cannot bring in facts about property 
identity to determine whether a coherent proposition is transparently coherent, as 
instructed in the third clause of the refined definition of transparent coherence.
Why is this a problem? Assume Ostrich nominalism is true. It would follow that 
essentialist modal rationalism would be inconsistent with Kripkean exemptions to 
Simple Modal Rationalism. Consider the proposition: <The material of the golden 
broach has atomic number 8>. This proposition is clearly coherent. And for the rea-
sons discussed above, if there are no properties associated with its predicates, then 
we cannot rule out its transparent coherence with reference to the identity of those 
properties or how they are conceived of. Hence, it seems we must conclude that this 
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proposition is transparently coherent and, assuming the Biconditional Transparency 
Coherence Principle, that there is a possible world at which it is true.
For those who accept the Kripkean exemptions to Simple Modal Rationalism, 
this is the wrong result. Strictly speaking, the transparency argument against physi-
calism would go through—as propositions concerning zombies would end up being 
transparently coherent for the same reason—but the victory would be won too eas-
ily. We cannot rule out psycho-physical empirical identities by ruling out all of the 
standardly accepted instances of empirical identities, such as <water is  H2O> and 
<Gold is the element with atomic number 79>.
Of course, we could just assert that essentialist modal rationalism is committed to 
the existence of properties, but this would give the view limited application. A bet-
ter way forward is to find a more nuanced definition of transparent concept such that 
predicates can express transparent concepts even in the absence of properties. This 
is what I will try to do in what follows.
I take it that, for the Ostrich nominalist, the predicates of true sentences capture 
something about reality, just not something that amounts to the presence or absence 
of entities.6 Imagine an Ostrich nominalist world W containing only a red, spherical 
object. If you only know that there is an object in W, then you are partially ignorant 
about W: you don’t know that the object in W is red and round. Your ignorance does 
not consist in failing to know that certain entities exist: there is only one entity and 
you know that it exists. Nonetheless, your ignorance concerns the metaphysical real-
ity of W.
In other words, for both the Ostrich nominalist and the property realist, there is 
something that is known about reality in knowing that a given predicate, say, charge, 
truly applies to something in the world. For the property realist, knowing what is 
ascribed by ‘charge’ will be a matter of knowing the essential nature of charge; for 
the Ostrich nominalist, it will be a matter of knowing what it is for something to be 
charged.
We can perhaps get clearer on this with reference to Theodore Sider’s notion of 
metaphysical truth conditions. The metaphysical truths conditions of a sentence are 
the truth-conditions of S in a perfectly natural language, that is to say a language 
involving only terms that perfectly carve nature at the joints. Metaphysical truth 
conditions apply to whole sentences, but we can think of a specific term in terms of 
its metaphysical contribution, that is to say, the contribution it makes to the meta-
physical truth conditions of sentences in which it is involved. If ‘negatively charged’ 
is a perfectly natural predicate, then its metaphysical contribution can, in part, be 
given as follows: For any sentence S of the form ‘X is charged’, S is true iff X is 
negatively charged.
To know the metaphysical contribution of the predicate ‘negatively charged’ is 
know what it is for something to be charged. Distinct predicates can make the same 
metaphysical contribution; and while some predicates will be a priori associated 
6 This needs to be qualified. Even for an austere nominalist, the successful application of some predi-
cates will be a matter of the presence of entities, e.g. ‘is identical with Kripke’. I am here focusing on 
those predicates that property realists take to correspond to perfectly natural properties.
 Synthese
1 3
with their metaphysical contribution, others will not. Contrast the following two 
sentences:
(A) ‘The table is spherical’
(B) ‘The table is as David thinks it is’, where David actually thinks the table is 
spherical, and the meaning of the predicate is such that its metaphysical contri-
bution across all possible worlds is determined by how David actually thinks the 
table is (i.e. it is a non-referential analogue of a rigid designator).
In both cases, the metaphysical contribution of the predicate is the same, but in the 
former but not the latter case someone who understands the predicate has a priori 
access to its metaphysical contribution. The person asserting sentence A knows what 
they are claiming about reality, whereas the person asserting sentence B may not.
In this way, we can give a definition of transparent concept such that a predicate 
can express a transparent concept even if it doesn’t refer to a property:
• Transparent Concept (refined definition)—A term T expresses a transparent con-
cept iff T’s metaphysical contribution is a priori accessible.7
With the refined definitions of transparent coherence and transparent concept, and 
a biconditional version of the Transparency Coherence Principle, we now have the 
resources in place to give a robust and highly flexible account of modal knowledge 
in terms of knowledge of coherence.
I argued in Consciousness and Fundamental Reality that an essentialist account 
of modal rationalism is to be preferred over Chalmers’ (2009) two-dimensional 
account of modal rationalism, as the former avoids the contentious meta-semantic 
assumptions embedded in the two-dimensional framework. I suppose some philoso-
phers may prefer Chalmers’ semantic commitments to the commitments to essence 
and perfect naturalness employed in my framework.8 I am persuaded on independent 
grounds that these latter commitments are indispensable but will not repeat these 
arguments here. For now, I leave it to others to decide which of these foundational 
commitments they find more palatable.9
9 I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers and for advice from the editor of this issue, Antonella Mal-
lozzi.
7 The corresponding definition of an opaque concept: A terms T expresses a transparent concept iff T’s 
metaphysical contribution is not a priori accessible.
8 One might wonder why we need to bring in a Siderian commitment to perfect naturalness in order to 
capture the idea that a predicate ‘F’ might be a priori associated with what it is for something to be F. 
The problem is that, so long as we are talking loosely, an austere nominalist must surely allow that there 
is a property of Fness, and likewise the property realist must allow talk of ‘what it is for an object to be 
F’. What I want talk of ‘metaphysical truth-conditions’ and ‘metaphysical contribution’ to hone in on is 
the most fundamental relationship between representation and reality, relative to various metaphysical 
theses. It is this that is revealed by a transparent concept, in the case of that concept. If austere nominal-
ism is true, then, at the most basic level, ‘X is F’ is true because X is F; whereas, if property realism is 
true, then, at the most basic level, ‘X is F’ is true because X instantiates Fness. Perhaps there are other 
ways to capture this kind of priority than investing in perfect naturalness, but it seems to me that some-
thing like this commitment is required.
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